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Taiwan and Hong Kong
1
 are both primarily defined in relation to the Chinese 
Mainland, although their histories are also marked by strong associations with 
colonial empires: in Hong Kong, the British (1841–1941, then 1945–1997) and the 
Japanese (1941–1945); and in Taiwan, the Spanish (in the north 1626–1646), the 
Dutch (in the south 1624–1662), the Japanese (1895–1945), and arguably the 
KMT (1947–1987). In both locations, contemporary politics is consequently marked 
by struggles over contested histories, identities, languages, and cultures, in which 
questions of political representation have become increasingly important. 
   In this introduction, we place this current situation of contested identities and 
politics in historical context. From the perspective of the Chinese Imperial court, 
Hong Kong and Taiwan were always regarded as peripheral, barren places 
populated by barbarians, rebellious pirates, and illiterate fishermen. Further, both 
locations were respectively ceded to and governed by British and Japanese 
colonial empires, which, in contrast to China, perceived fertile land with economic 
potential in locations of strategic importance. Hong Kong and Taiwan were thus 
brought into the world capitalist system by the colonial powers, and underwent 
rapid transformations from rural modes of life into modern capitalist formations. 
However, both locations were profoundly affected by the conflict between the 
Nationalists and the Communists on the Chinese Mainland after World War II: 
Hong Kong’s population trebled due to the arrival of refugees, while the eventual 
defeat of the KMT led to the retreat of the Nationalist government to Taiwan. 
Throughout these histories of migration, resistance, colonialism, and civil wars, the 
so-called ‘ethnic group’ ( !) has emerged as a new category of historical subject 
that challenges the very concept of ‘the Chinese’, and the result has been a politics 
based around competing identities and representations.
   The crucial question here is whether the politics of identity in Hong Kong can 
develop in such a way under the ‘one country, two systems’ model that its 
inhabitants will be allowed to take responsibility for organizing their own lives 
together, and decide what common rules they will live under. This in turn raises 
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 By Hong Kong is meant here the region comprising Hong Kong Island "# , Kowloon $
%, New Territories &' and outlying islands. 
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another question, of whether Taiwan will be able to retain its own identity and 
democracy if it is forced to follow the model of Hong Kong. The outcome will 
depend on to what extent Hong Kong will develop a representative political system, 
and whether democratic culture in Taiwan can be enriched and given a firm basis. 
As such, rather than being a comprehensive comparison of both locations, this 
introductory essay aims to highlight parallels beyond the most readily-apparent 
connections, as well as resonances that exist between the two locations despite 
the lack of direct communication. In particular, we explore centre–periphery 
dynamics in imperial China, as well as in colonialism and the world capitalist 
system, as well as democracy as a universal value and the politics of 
representation after World War II. 
On the Periphery of Chinese Imperial Courts 
Imperial China tended to define its domain as a land naturally bounded by 
mountains, rivers and seas, and places such as Taiwan and Hong Kong were 
regarded as peripheral, both geographically and politically. Hong Kong is off the 
southern coast of China, located in the South China Sea at the mouth of the Pearl 
River Delta, while Taiwan is separated from the southeast coast of China by the 
Taiwan Strait, which is about 161 kilometres wide. Both locations were inhabited 
by indigenous peoples who predate the first Han Chinese immigrants. Taiwan, up 
until the early seventeenth century, was inhabited almost exclusively by 
Austronesian peoples, with linguistic and genetic ties to other Austronesian ethnic 
groups spreading over maritime Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Madagascar, while 
the Hong Kong region was originally home to the Yao people, and to the boat-
dwelling Tanka (()), who were descended from the Dan who were probably 
themselves also of Yao stock.  
   Due to conflict in the centre and north of China over many years during the Song 
Dynasty (960–1279), the focus of Han civilization shifted to the river valleys and 
plains of southern China, with the coastal Fujian and Zhejiang provinces becoming 
the Han demographic and cultural centres (Shepherd 1993: 398). The remoteness 
of Taiwan and Hong Kong from the Imperial Court meant that these locations 
became home for those who needed to flee China during periods of economic, 
political, social, and cultural upheaval. 
   In time, Hong Kong became the final bastion for the Han Chinese rulers of the 
Southern Song Dynasty, who were defeated in the war against the Mongols: the 
Song Court retreated to Lantau Island (*+,), and the last Song Emperor Bing 
(-./) was enthroned there at the age of eight in a place called Mui Wo (01). 
After his final defeat, the child Emperor ended his life by drowning with his officials, 
in what is today known as Yamen (23) Town. One of these officials, named Hau 
Wong, is still enshrined and worshipped in Tung Chung (45) Valley on Lantau 
Island in Hong Kong today. 
   Centuries later, Taiwan similarly became the last refuge of Ming Dynasty 
loyalists who rejected Qing rule, with Zheng Cheng-gong (678, also known as 
Koxinga9:;) and his successors establishing the Kingdom of Tungning (4<=
9) on the island after retreating from Amoy in 1661. This entwined the fates of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, when the Kangxi Emperor ordered a Great Clearance 
(1661–1669) of the southern coast as a measure to isolate the Zheng family 
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regime. It was reported that around 16,000 so-called ‘locals’ belonging to the five 
clans (who had arrived during Southern Song Dynasty period) were forced to leave 
Hong Kong, and only 1,600 later returned (Ingham 2007: 7). Meanwhile, Zheng 
ousted the Dutch from their settlement of Zeelandia (>?@A) on Taiwan, but he 
died soon after the last Ming claimant had been captured and killed, and his 
grandson eventually surrendered to Shi Lang (BC), the Qing admiral, in 1683. 
After this, Taiwan fell under nominal Qing authority. 
   While Hong Kong’s first population boom occurred during the Yuan period of 
Mongol rule in China, Taiwan saw large numbers of Chinese immigrants arrive 
during the Qing period of Manchu rule in China. In both cases, the refugees and 
migrants were initially led by frontiersmen and traders, and they brought their 
native languages and cultures to their new homes: in Hong Kong, the first Han 
Chinese immigrants, known as ‘the five clans of Tang, Man, Liu, Pang, and Hau’ 
(&'D*E FGFHIJKL), were largely Hakka. From the eleventh century they 
settled in the New Territories (for further details see Tang n.d.), which was part of 
Guangdong (Canton) province until 1898, and they gradually adopted Cantonese. 
Moreover, from the time that Chinese settlers to Hong Kong brought Sinicization, 
the indigenous Yao and Tanka peoples were gradually Sinicized, and they now 
speak Cantonese (Ng with Baker 1983: 22–23). In Taiwan, the majority were from 
Southern Fujian, and they spoke the Quanzhou (MN) and Zhangzhou (ON) 
forms of the Hoklo (PQ) language. There was also a minority of Hakka (R)) 
people who were originally from the border between Fujian and Guangdong.F
   The early Qing era saw the development of the largest empire in Chinese history 
under the Kangxi (reigned 1661–1722), Yongzheng (reigned 1722–35) and 
Qianlong (reigned 1735–1796) Emperors. However, Taiwan and Hong Kong were 
regarded as secluded and barren places in the East, occupied by savages, pirates, 
and rebels. The Kangxi Emperor showed no interest in ruling Taiwan; the island 
was a distant ‘ball of mud’ and therefore, in his view ‘taking it is no gain; not taking 
it is no loss’ (‘STUVWFXUYZ[\F]XYZ^’). Originally, it was envisioned that 
Taiwan would be abandoned and its Chinese population evacuated once all the 
resistance forces were defeated. It is estimated that the Chinese population in 
Taiwan in 1684 dropped by a third, leaving fewer than 80,000 individuals 
(Shepherd 1993: 106). Most of those who remained had married indigenous 
women and held property on the island. 
   However, Admiral Shi had a different view of Taiwan; he argued that abandoning 
Taiwan would likely turn it into a lair of pirates, and as such it was worthwhile 
maintaining control of the island, at least to keep it out of the hands of hostile 
powers. The Qing court eventually took Shi’s advice, and in 1684 the island was 
made a prefecture of Fujian province. However, the new prefecture was difficult to 
govern, due to numerous fights between the new Han settlers and the indigenous 
Austronesian people; there were also constant conflicts between Quanzhou and 
Zhangzhou speakers over land, and these Fujian settlers also fought later settlers 
from Guangdong.  
   Qing rule over Taiwan therefore was not concerned with developing the island, 
but rather with preventing it from becoming a source of trouble (Shepherd 1993: 
105–108, 142–146). Thus, a partial quarantine was imposed: the ban on maritime 
commerce was lifted, but crossings between the Mainland and Taiwan were 
regulated and required travel papers approved by the authorities on both sides of 
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the Taiwan Strait. Also, while promoting the repopulation of coastal areas under 
Han control, the Government placed strict restrictions on migration from the 
Mainland. Immigration policy fluctuated, with periods up until 1788 during which 
male labourers who travelled seasonally to the island were not allowed to bring 
their wives or families.  
   These quarantine policies, however, were undermined by population growth and 
economic expansion that increased the demand for frontier products. Han 
frontiersmen thus sought opportunities within local networks and gained access to 
local resources, resulting in inter-marriage with Aboriginal women and the growth 
of mixed families. Many single Chinese men married locally, as described in a 
Taiwanese saying: ‘We have Han Chinese grandfathers, but no Han Chinese 
grandmothers’ (‘_`ab,cdeab,f ’). Additionally, Chinese migrants 
tended to form bonds of cooperation with their fellows from the same ancestral 
place. These associations were formalized in the late imperial era through the 
founding of organizations called tongxianghui (ghi ), which were run on 
democratic lines and open to most fellow migrants. Religion also helped to 
promote solidarity among fellow migrants via the worship of common ancestors 
and also the patron god/desses from their ancestral places (J. Cole 1996:158–159).  
The Colonial Powers and the World Capitalist System
Hong Kong, as it exists today, was the outcome of negotiations and three treaties 
signed between China and Britain over fifty years in the nineteenth century, at a 
time when the Qing Empire was in decline. Following the First Anglo-Chinese War 
(also known as the First Opium war, 1839–1842), the Qing signed the Treaty of 
Nanjing, which ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British in perpetuity. After the 
Second Anglo-Chinese War (1858–1860), the Convention of Peking gave the 
Kowloon peninsula (and Stonecutters Island jkl ) to the British, again ‘in 
perpetuity’. Finally, against extensive armed resistance, the Qing Empire signed 
the Second Convention of Peking, which gave the New Territories and outlying 
islands to the British on a one-hundred year lease in 1898. Granting Hong Kong 
extraterritorial status was, at the time, seen by the Chinese as convenient, as it 
meant that the foreigners there could more easily govern themselves (Hsü 2000: 
191). 
   With attacks by British and French forces in 1884–1885, the Qing court 
eventually realized the strategic importance of Taiwan. The island was brought 
under tighter control and raised to full provincial status. It was also given a higher-
ranking governor with a military background, Liu Ming-chuan (mno, governor 
1885–1892). Under Liu’s governance, a public education system and light industry 
were introduced, along with telegram and postal services and also a railway along 
the northwest coast from Keelung (pq) to Hsinchu (&r). However, within less 
than three years, the Qing Empire was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
after losing the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). This treaty ceded Taiwan, 
together with Pescadores, to the Japanese in perpetuity. 
   Hong Kong’s experience of British colonialism was somewhat different from 
Taiwan’s experience of Japanese colonialism. Hong Kong was undertaken solely 
for commercial reasons; the British in Hong Kong never embarked on the 
wholesale ‘reform’ of their colonial subjects, and were content to leave them to 
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themselves (except, of course, where their activities interfered with trade). By 
contrast, Japan decided to avoid becoming itself colonized by instead ‘catching up 
with the West’ (Ts’ai 2009: 23, quoting Kawashima 2004: 69), modernizing itself, 
and joining the colonial powers. Taiwan was Japan’s first colony, and when it 
ceded control in 1945 after World War II it was also its last. However, at the time 
when Japan took control of Taiwan, Japan was barely ready to enter into the 
colonial enterprise. Lacking colonial experience, Japan framed its colonial model 
with reference to European ideas and practices, mapping out a security region in 
which it further developed its interest in overseas trade. 
   At the start of Japan’s military takeover of Taiwan, several rebellions broke out 
across the island. As a result, Japan decided to keep Taiwan under military rule. 
There were three military Governor-Generals and constant fighting; this period has 
been called an ‘age of mistakes and failure’ (Lamley 1999: 205). The military 
administration did not resolve problems, but instead provoked further resistance. It 
was a very expensive time, both in terms of cost (for maintaining the police force) 
and also in terms of lives (lost from combat and disease).  
   There are similarities here with the situation in the New Territories. Until 1898, 
the villagers in the New Territories, administratively part of Xin’an County (&st), 
regarded themselves as part of Mainland China. Resenting their incorporation into 
the British colony, the larger Cantonese-speaking clans mobilized their members in 
armed resistance, in what Patrick Hase calls ‘a small colonial war’ (2008: 5). The 
British responded with force of arms, aided by a proclamation from the Viceroy of 
Canton exhorting the villagers to ‘tremble and obey’ and abide by the terms of the 
treaty (Hayes 2006: 8–9; Hase 2008: 41). Thereafter, the people of the New 
Territories often proved recalcitrant colonial subjects, and the Heung Yee Kuk (!
uv , Rural Council) was established in 1926 as a statutory advisory body to 
negotiate with the colonial government and promote the welfare of the people of 
the New Territories. Although there were improved transport links through the 
century – the Kowloon Canton Railway ($wxy) was built in 1910 – and the 
presence of many British soldiers, these areas remained marginal. Eventually, the 
British administration, in a further attempt at pacification pursuant to development 
in the 1950s, granted indigenous New Territories residents special rights. The 
1984 Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law also recognized the rights of 
indigenous residents (Ng with Baker 1983), who were defined as those who could 
trace their ancestry back to before British colonization.  
   Taiwan, meanwhile, for the first half of the century found itself part of an 
expanding colonial empire, as Japan moved into Korea in 1910 and Manchukuo in 
1932, and eventually, in 1940, established the so-called ‘Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere’ (*4z{|}). However, Japan’s policies reveal conflicting 
attitudes: Japan adopted the British system of governing the home country and the 
colony separately, but unlike Britain – which generally allowed its colonial subjects 
to retain their culture – Japan wanted to culturally re-engineer the inhabitants of 
Taiwan. After the Wushe Incident (~) of 1930, Japan employed the French 
colonial model and put greater emphasis on assimilation. Taiwanese subject-
citizens were encouraged to adopt Japanese language and culture, and with the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, assimilation began to be 
enforced through the militarizing Kominka Movement (), which was 
imposed until the end of World War II.  
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   By acquiring Taiwan as its first colonial territory, Japan formally joined the list of 
colonial powers. The task of colonizing Taiwan became a symbol for the nation of 
Japan, meaning that Japan was, from that moment, on an equal footing with 
Europe. Japan endeavoured to raise itself to the level of a ‘civilized’ country, and it 
tried to modernize its institutions in accordance with European models. At the 
same time, though, it made an appeal to the European colonial powers about her 
mission to ‘civilize’ Taiwan: European colonial empires and Japan adopted the 
same ideas to justify their colonial adventures, such as bringing the light of 
civilization to allegedly ‘primitive’ peoples. However, although some colonial actors 
had religious or humanitarian aims, the colonial powers’ actual motive was to gain 
to access to natural and human resources, and trade and profit. 
   This can be seen in the case of colonial Hong Kong. For almost the entire period 
of British rule, the administration adhered to the principles of liberal, laissez-faire
economics and the related doctrine of the non-interference of government in social 
affairs. However, although in theory free market forces prevailed, in practice, 
cartels, corruption and cronyism distorted the operation of the economic sphere. 
Trade – including trade with China – remained the cardinal imperative of colonial 
rule. As far as London was concerned, colonies were meant to make money, or at 
least be self-sufficient. They were not meant to soak up funds. This partly explains 
London’s reluctance to sanction spending on welfare and infrastructure, and the 
Hong Kong administration’s emphasis on hard work and self-help as the route to 
success. In this regard, Hong Kong governance for much of the twentieth century 
closely echoed that of mid-Victorian Britain. Its tax system harked back even 
further, to the eighteenth century, favouring the accumulation of wealth and 
minimal government expenditure. The government’s general indifference to social 
matters meant that those disadvantaged by the operation of the free market could 
expect no assistance, whilst those who benefited could depend upon politicians 
not to interfere in their more rapacious practices. Indeed, the government itself was 
entirely comprised of European and – from about the 1880s – Chinese men of 
commerce, whose interests, despite their ethnic differences, were often identical: 
trade, commerce and profit (Munn 2001). Dominant economic roles were played 
by British conglomerates (known as ‘foreign hongs’  ), such as Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. and Swire, local Chinese compradors such as Ho Tung (4), 
who collaborated with the British, and local Chinese merchant families, such as the 
family of Lee (E) ), which owned extensive land in Causeway Bay, and the 
family of Li (E) ) which founded the Bank of East Asia in this period. By the 
1960s, these close ties between business and government earned the government 
the nickname ‘Hong Kong Inc’. 
   The co-option of the Chinese elite in the latter part of the nineteenth century 
provided not so much a counter-weight to the influence of the European elite as 
added ballast to its continued rule (Carroll 2005). Together, they formed a 
mercantilist – and later an industrial and financial – hegemonic class (Chan 1991; 
B.K.P. Leung 1996: 39). Particularistic ties amongst the political and business 
elites were mirrored in the underworld by triad-run criminal syndicates and 
syndicated police corruption. As such, from the 1880s onwards, they increasingly 
came into conflict with the ‘coolie class’ they exploited. Episodes of labour unrest 
and insurrection in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also reflected anti-
foreign, pro-China sentiments, indicating a fragile or non-existent loyalty to Hong 
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Kong (Tsai 1993). Movements for political change on the Mainland drew support 
from the Hong Kong population, most notably during the 1911 Revolution. It is this 
and subsequent episodes of cross-border political alliances that colour today’s 
Mainland government view of Hong Kong as a base for subversion. 
   By contrast, Taiwan had since the 1900s experienced a series of colonial 
reforms which sought to integrate Taiwan into the hierarchy of the colonial 
administrative mechanism and into a new web of economic relationships with 
Japan in the world capitalist system. A key feature of Japanese colonial rule from 
1901 was administration through a centralized police force with the aid of the hook 
() system, which built upon natural settlements (i.e., neighbourhood units of 
ten to twenty households) serving as basic units for colonial administration (Ts’ai 
2009: 93–118). Thus, a modern administrative system was established out of and 
rooted in age-old migration settlements for social control and economic 
development. For the first time, migration settlements and neighbourhood units 
were recognized as legal and political entities. This local system was further in line 
with the tradition of the county administration, which facilitated interaction between 
the state and local police force. As such, society and state were beginning to meet 
at the county level and by the 1920 Japan’s rule over Taiwan delegated part of its 
power to local government in a way that followed Tokyo’s ‘extension of policies in 
Japan proper to colonies (naichi encho V)’ (Ts’ai 2006: 98). 
   The modernization initiated by Liu Ming-chuan was expanded and consolidated: 
Japan set about road-building and developing railways; schools, postal and 
telegraphy facilities were established; and there was improved public health and 
sanitation, as well as more extensive hospitals. At the same time, agriculture and 
industry were improved; civil institutions were introduced; and mechanisms of law 
and order put in place. Japan also introduced newspapers, modern accounting, a 
banking system, and corporate enterprises. However, natural resources were 
squeezed out of Taiwan for the benefit of metropolitan Japan, in a process 
involving shifts in land ownership, the commodification of agriculture, and the 
emergence of a new wealthy and powerful capitalist class.  
   In particular, agriculture was reformed to meet Japan’s consumption needs and 
to compete in the international market: Taiwanese farmers were gradually forced 
to shift from subsistence agriculture towards the production of goods for export 
(the three major exports – the so-called ‘cash-crops’ – were tea, sugar and 
camphor). There was also public investment in modernization, such as irrigation, 
improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides (Ka 1995: 61). Taiwan was indeed a 
laboratory of Japan’s empire-building, and the experiment further evolved into the 
‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ during the Pacific War. 
   Hong Kong also experienced Japanese rule, when the area was occupied from 
1941–1945. One-and-a-half million people left the territory during this time, and 
others were forcibly repatriated to the Mainland (Baker 1993: 865). Many 
Hongkongers who returned to the Mainland fought the Japanese, while those who 
remained were exhorted by the Japanese to renounce their colonial identity and to 
regard themselves instead as members of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere, led by Japan. However, whilst members of the Chinese elite did 
collaborate with the Japanese, other Hongkongers joined forces with the British 
Army Aid Group to assist with gathering intelligence and rescuing prisoners of war. 
It was a sharp contrast: in Taiwan, Japan was using prisoners of war captured at 
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the surrenders of Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines and the Dutch East 
Indies as slaves for the Japanese war effort. 
Post World War II and the Politics of Representation  
Hong Kong and Taiwan have also long been seen as places of transit, as regards 
people, goods/commodities, and money. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, successive waves of migrants fled to Hong Kong or to Taiwan, or via 
both places to other areas of Southeast Asia, escaping political persecution, social 
upheaval, poverty and civil strife in Mainland China. In particular, there was large-
scale immigration from China to both places after World War II: thousands who 
had fled to China from Hong Kong during wartime returned, accompanied by 
refugees fleeing the conflict between the Nationalist and Communist forces on the 
Mainland. Amongst these were Nationalist sympathizers en route to Taiwan; 
however, many simply stayed in Hong Kong, occupying Nationalist enclaves and 
squatter villages such as Tiu King Leng (). 
   The then-ruling government in China – the Kuomingtang (KMT, Chinese 
Nationalist Party) – retreated to Taiwan between 1947 and 1949, following the 
defeat of its forces on Mainland China at the end of the civil war with the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The decision to give Taiwan to the KMT had been made 
by the Allies at the Cairo Conference of 1943 on the condition that the three 
nations (the ROC, US and UK) would fight alongside one another until Japan’s 
surrender. Indeed, the Americans at this time had initially wanted the Nationalist 
government to be given control of Hong Kong too, due to reservations about the 
British resumption of colonial rule. However, with Mao’s victory in 1949 and the 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the geopolitical landscape 
radically altered. Overnight, Hong Kong became an important asset for Western 
powers in their defence against communism along the ‘Bamboo Curtain’. The 
Treaty of San Francisco, which Japan signed in 1951, stated that ‘Japan 
renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores’, but it did not 
specifiy what Taiwan’s legal status actually was. In the years that followed, the 
Americans and the British were opposed to Taiwan being taken over by the PRC’s 
CCP, but they did not see Taiwan as a base for recovering Mainland China by the 
KMT either (for further information, see Wang 2014).  
   The KMT’s ROC de facto had no authority beyond Taiwan, but the party 
continued to assert its position as the sole legitimate government of all China. It 
regarded itself as in temporary exile on Taiwan, and the island was imagined as a 
mere province of a much larger Republic (Rigger 2011: 136). Also, memories of 
the eight-year war against Japan were still fresh: in 1946, KMT officials who were 
sent to survey Taiwan had reported that people in Taiwan had been ‘enslaved’ as 
the outcome of fifty years of colonization by Japan (Chen 2002). In this way, a new 
distinct historical subject was defined: the benshengren  (provincial natives, 
or Taiwanese) seen as an ‘ethnic group’ with its own language, colonial history, 
and way of life (for further details, see Shih 2012). 
   The distinction between benshengren and Chinese Mainlanders was deepened 
by the 2-28 Incident, which broke out at the end of February 1947 (Edmondson 
2002: 25). A benshengren widow who was selling untaxed cigarettes at a street 
stand had her goods and takings confiscated by KMT officials, one of whom also 
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pistol-whipped her. The surrounding crowd began to protest, and one man was 
killed as officials fired their guns into the crowd. This prompted further protests, 
which were met with machine-gun fire. As news of the killings was broadcast and 
spread across Taiwan, violence erupted island-wide. This was followed by an 
operation called ‘village sweeping’ (h ) across the island, in which village 
collaborators helped to track down wanted people who were in hiding. This 
resulted in many more members of the elite and young students educated during 
the Japanese colonial period being either killed on the streets or arrested and then 
executed (Fleischauer 2011). 
   The violence has since been framed as an instance of ‘ethnic conflict’, and those 
who fled from Mainland China (i.e., from the provinces other than Taiwan) at the 
end of Chinese civil war during October 1945 and February 1955 became known 
as waishengren (provincial outsiders, or Mainlanders) (Corcuff 2002: 164). 
In the aftermath of the 2-28 Incident, martial law was introduced following a 
constitutional amendment called the ‘Temporary Provisions Effective During the 
Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion’ (‘
  ’), which then led to the anti-Communist repression known as White 
Terror. Although making up around 13 percent of Taiwan’s population, 
waishengren represented approximately 80 percent of the ruling class, civil service, 
and educational and military sectors (Corcuff 2002: 163). The category of 
waishengren was thus seen, in contrast to benshengren, as an ‘ethnic’ group, 
defined through the shared experience of fighting against Japan followed by 
Chinese civil war, and as a homogenous privileged class with an identity that 
looked forward to recovering China or re-unification. 
   In contrast, in Hong Kong, refugees’ previous links to China provided some 
cultural anchorage to their places of origin, through their way of life. The majority 
were Cantonese-speakers from Guangdong, along with some merchants from 
Shanghai, as well as Mandarin-speaking intellectuals from the north. Political 
affiliations also played a role: some refugees identified with the Nationalist cause, 
while other refugees who fled to Hong Kong during the Cold War still clung to 
some forms of Communism, despite having fled the famine caused by the Great 
Leap Forward in 1962, the unrest of the Cultural Revolution from 1966–1976, or 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. As the prospect of sojourning somewhere 
else receded and a new generation came into existence, Hong Kong became 
‘home’. According to Hugh Baker, it was refugee migrants – at first sojourners, 
later settlers – who ‘became the stuff of which Hong Kong Man was made’ (1993: 
865). This category of Hongkongers has thus also developed as a distinct 
historical subject, known as Heunggongyahn (Hongkongers "#), also defined 
in terms of an ‘ethnic group’ with its common features of exile from China, refugee 
experiences, British colonial rule, and particular ways of life. 
   Throughout the Cold War period, the KMT in Taiwan represented continuity with 
the Republican legacy in China, and promoted its version of Chinese culture in the 
so-called ‘Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement’ (¡¢I£¤), which 
was presented as a contrast to the CCP’s Cultural Revolution on the Mainland 
(Katz 2003: 402–405). This ‘re-Sinicization’ policy was seen also as a de-
Japanization campaign that was meant to wash away Taiwan’s past and colonial 
history. It re-engineered Taiwan’s supposed historical connection with Greater 
China, and also re-connected Taiwan with the supposed territory of early 
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twentieth-century China (as far as Outer Mongolia). Furthermore, by imposing the 
Beijing form of Mandarin as the national language (9¥), the KMT suppressed 
other Chinese languages, such as Hoklo and Hakka, which had long before the 
KMT’s arrival been used on a daily basis by benshengren. Indeed, the ‘re-
Sinicization’ policy was a kind of cultural colonialism imposed on ethnic Hoklo and 
Hakka groups. Benshengren languages were downgraded to the marginal status 
of patois and banned in the media and schools. The imperial centre–periphery 
dynamic re-appeared in the power relations between the ruling KMT waishengren
and the ruled benshengren. 
   Again in contrast, as regard cultural policy, both the British government in 
London and its administration in Hong Kong were concerned to avoid any action – 
such as repression of cultural activities – which might provoke intervention in the 
colony by Communist China or Nationalist Taiwan. When the question of 
democracy was mooted, it was the Hong Kong elite that London heeded, rather 
than the voices of those clamouring for representation (Tsang 1988). Strict 
application of the rule of law was officially endorsed as a means of ensuring 
impartial treatment for all political groups. Though thousands were detained and 
deported for subversive activities, London urged tolerance and a low-key approach 
towards visiting Communist and Nationalist cultural groups.  
   This apparent tolerance of political activists, and of refugees’ cultural distance, 
has been seen by some as providing a space within which various communities 
were able to carve out for themselves a sphere of existence distinct from their 
distant rulers. Lau and Kuan (1988: 191), for example, describe a minimally 
integrated social-political system which allowed the ethos of the Hong Kong 
Chinese to flourish. They point out (20) that, unlike other colonial subjects, the 
Chinese who came to Hong Kong were largely self-selected: that is, they opted to 
reside under a colonial government which had brought with it an administrative and 
physical infrastructure preferable to what they had experienced in China itself. This 
did not necessarily mean that British colonial government was therefore regarded 
as legitimate; Pro-China ‘leftists’ and nationalistic intellectuals both remembered 
that the British had arrived through invasions and unequal treaties, and agreed that 
colonial rule was consequently illegitimate. Indeed, such views were held by even 
ordinary Hong Kong people, with the exception of pro-British Chinese elites and 
the upper class. Colonial rule – which before the 1970s was quite unfair and 
authoritarian – was, though, accepted for practical reasons. 
   Thus there was a general acceptance of authority, and an attitude of 
‘utilitarianistic familism’ (Lau and Kuan 1988: 20; Vickers and Kan 2005: 175). The 
non-interventionism of British colonialism was particularly marked in Hong Kong, 
due to the awareness that the colony may return to China; this may have appealed 
due to the traditional proclivity to keep government at arm’s length. This absence 
of government from the daily lives of the population, Lau and Kuan hold, led to an 
alienation between the two, and a failure by government to provide a model of 
moral values. Describing a problem which is as true of contemporary Hong Kong 
as it was of the 1960s, the result was a ‘lack of moral linkage’ between the rulers 
and the ruled. 
   Indeed, as far as China and the British governments were concerned, Hong 
Kong had no identity or culture of its own. It was simply an economic city, its 
residents concerned principally with making money, eating, dancing and gambling. 
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Through ‘community building’ initiatives, and a re-iteration of the UK’s commitment 
to the rule of law, the administration sought to convince Hong Kong people that the 
city was a better prospect than Communist China, to prevent the city ‘turning red’ 
and to attach the Chinese population to colonial rule without granting them 
universal suffrage.  
   However, the 1970s gradually saw the superpowers favour China (PRC) over 
Taiwan (ROC) at the United Nations and in international diplomacy, although 
Taiwan remained strategically central to the US presence in the Asia Pacific. For 
the British government in London, Taiwan was merely of marginal interest, 
although for the British administration in Hong Kong, the island remained a 
sensitive presence – the KMT had links with affiliated groups in Hong Kong, and 
throughout the period the British were under pressure to demonstrate even-
handed treatment of Communist and Nationalist activists. The latter were 
repeatedly accused by Beijing of following a ‘Two China’ policy. 
   By the early 1970s, it was also clear in Taiwan that there was very little hope of 
recovering the Mainland, while there was increased dissatisfaction with the KMT’s 
continually unmet but constitutionally required promise of democracy on the part 
both of benshengren and some waishengren. A token free-press magazine, Free 
China Fortnightly (¦§¡9¨©ª), run by a waishengren named Lei Chen («¬), 
began to criticize KMT authoritarian rule; further, a few Mainlanders and 
Taiwanese campaigned together for local elections and for the creation of an 
opposition party. Internal and external challenges both increased the pressure on 
the KMT to justify its claim to legitimacy by reforming the political and electoral 
system. 
   However, because opposition political parties were banned, opposition took the 
form of the Dangwai (Outside the KMT Party) movement. In 1979, the movement’s 
leaders founded Formosa (­®¯°±) magazine as an island-wide platform for 
campaigning for democratic reform and raising awareness of the politics of 
representation. On 10 December 1979, it arranged a march in Kaohsiung in 
commemoration of International Human Rights Day, following which eight protest 
leaders were given long jail sentences (Denny 2003: 168–169). However, Amnesty 
International publicized their fate (Amnesty International 1980), and the KMT came 
under pressure from the US government and a lobby of exiled Taiwanese-
Americans. Calls for democratic reform and Taiwanization gained momentum: the 
first major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (the DPP), was 
formed in 1986 and legalized in 1989, while martial law was finally lifted in 1987. 
   Reform in Hong Kong took the form of managed change: the 1984 Sino-British 
Joint Declaration introduced a transitional period, at the end of which Hong Kong 
was to be transformed from a British colony into a Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) of China. The Declaration provided a framework – ‘one country, two 
systems’ – which it was hoped would ensure the continuation of what was seen as 
Hong Kong’s ‘way of life’ after the 1997 handover to China. This framework has 
also been cited as a model for uniting Taiwan with China. 
   However, the Joint Declaration was permeated with what Yiu-Wai Chu (2013: 
12–15) calls the ‘misrecognition’ of Hong Kong. The image of Hong Kong people to 
which it appealed was an older colonial conception of Hongkongers as apolitical 
seekers of wealth, homo economicus personified (Jones 1999: 49–50). 
Consequently, the Declaration included only limited protections for Hong Kong’s 
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‘way of life’ after 1997. Both governments ignored signs of growing political 
activism and demands by Hong Kong people for a voice in their own affairs; since 
the 1960s, the demographic and cultural profile of the city had altered, and, as 
noted above, a younger generation born in Hong Kong began to claim the city as 
their home. Before the free flow of people between China and Hong Kong came to 
an end in 1950, there were very few permanent residents of Hong Kong who 
identified themselves as ‘Hongkongers’; this changed for those who came of age in 
the 1970s, and who, inspired by the west, were influenced by modern universal 
values (e.g. democracy, human rights, and justice). This new generation 
participated in various student and social movements, such as the Protect 
Diaoyutai Movement (²), the Legalization of Chinese Language Movement 
(³´¡Iµ¶) and the movement that emerged in response to the Golden 
Jubilee School Corruption Incident (·¸ ). These movement leaders and 
activists, such as Szeto Wah (¹º¢) and Cheung Man-kwong (»I¼) later 
become the core members of the democracy movement in Hong Kong from the 
mid-1980s. 
   Britain attempted to give Hong Kong people political representation after the 
signing of the Joint Declaration, as part of the decolonization process. Indirectly 
elected legislative counsellors were introduced in 1985, and in 1988 there was a 
proposal, rejected by China, for direct elections. However, the June Fourth Incident 
was a catalyst for further democratic development in Hong Kong, as indicated in a 
pre-1997 slogan of ‘Resist Communism with Democracy’ (‘½¾{’). This trend 
consolidated the social and political distinction between Hong Kong – the ‘city of 
law’ – and Mainland China, where the government used armed force to repress 
protest. Combined with the growth of local Cantonese culture, June Fourth 
probably did more than any government strategy to promote a strong sense of 
local identity. 
   In an attempt to stave off capital-flight, calm fears, and stem mass emigration, 
the colonial government introduced a Bill of Rights, offering legal protections up to 
and after the 1997 retrocession. For a few years in the run-up to 1997, Hong Kong 
experienced an astonishing flourishing of human rights discourse and legal 
activism, all of which contributed further to its sense of itself as a ‘city of law’. Since 
1997, the popular belief in the rule of law as a core Hong Kong value has made it 
the lightning rod around which anxieties about the depredations of the Mainland 
authorities have clustered. China’s attempts to re-shape Hong Kong’s law and 
legal institutions have become major rallying points for anti-Mainland protests 
(Jones 2007). 
   Hong Kong scholars now agree that social, political and economic changes 
between the 1950s and 1970s laid the foundation for the emergence of a 
distinctive Hong Kong identity (Carroll 2007). Factors central to this hegemonic 
restructuring included: the introduction of the Independent Commission Against 
Corruption in 1974 to end backdoor means of enhancement; the substitution of 
legal rights for political rights, and of legal representation for political 
representation; and a renewed emphasis on the rule of law as the guarantor of a 
level playing-field and equal opportunities for all. Government embarked on a 
programme of dissolving old particularistic ties and associations, and creating 
instead a new sense of loyalty to and identification with Hong Kong. Furthermore, 
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the ideology of the rule of law successfully represented as fair, just and deserved 
the continuing structural inequities of an undemocratic society. 
   Hong Kong’s sense of itself was also developed by the signing of the Sino-British 
Joint Declaration in 1984, and, after June Fourth, the Wilson ‘Rose Garden’ 
strategy of building new infrastructure (in particular, a new airport). Stephen Teo 
(2000) remarks that whilst Taiwan’s Mandarin cinema prevailed in Hong Kong until 
the mid-1970s, thereafter there was a ‘Cantonese Comeback’. Hong Kong films 
extolled populist values, native language, and by the 1980s social realist films 
were being made by local directors concerning Hong Kong society, the plight of 
displaced peoples and the experience of exile (Brett Erens 2000). Local writing, 
Canto-pop
2
 and kung-fu flourished, assisted by a local television channel (TVB) 
that was created in 1967 (P.-K. Leung 2000). In the mid-1970s, songs such as 
‘Eiffel Tower above the Clouds’ (x¿ÀÁ) and the theme song to the television 
series, ‘Under the Lion Rock’ (ÂÃ,Ä) marked a significant turn towards local 
self-consciousness and an emotional sense of Hong Kong as ‘our home’; the latter 
song was regarded almost as a ‘regional anthem’. The Joint declaration and the 
June Fourth Incident intensified fears and anxieties about losing this ‘home’. 
   By such means, Ping-Kwan Leung (2000) argues, cultural work has helped 
define and rethink Hong Kong’s identity through the construction of various 
narratives about and images of the city. This burgeoning sense of identity survived 
the increased economic integration with the Mainland’s economy in the 1980s, 
following the ‘open door’ reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, and Hong 
Kong’s reinvention of itself as an international financial – rather than a 
manufacturing – centre in the 1980s and 1990s. Carroll notes that a 1985 survey 
showed that three-fifths of Hongkongers preferred to see themselves as 
Hongkongers rather than Chinese (Carroll 2007: 170)
3
. Nevertheless, they were 
excluded from the signing of the Joint Declaration between China and Britain. This 
was locally portrayed as Margaret Thatcher ‘selling Hong Kong down the river’, or 
as a traditional Chinese arranged marriage in which the bride had no say (Carroll 
2007: 182). 
   Subsequent negotiations over the Basic Law, the new airport, and disputes 
about the post-1997 legal and political arrangements made the years between 
1984 and 1997 times of heightened uncertainty and anxiety. Hongkongers were 
promised a high degree of autonomy and ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’, 
under the somewhat amorphous ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula, originally 
developed by Deng Xiaoping to facilitate Taiwan’s re-incorporation into Mainland 
China. The prospect of being returned to China made Hongkongers hyper-vigilant 
about actual or potential incursions from the Mainland. The notion that the ‘One 
Country, Two Systems’ formula was a ‘blueprint’ for Taiwan also meant that Hong 
Kong was now regarded as a harbinger of Taiwan’s fate. 
   In contrast, the 1990s in Taiwan saw a peaceful transition to democratic 
elections. Benshengren were from that time allowed to vote and stand for public 
office; the opposition DPP was born out of the civic struggle for political 
                                                 
2
 Chu (2013) describes Canto-pop as music with lyrics written in standard modern Chinese 
but pronounced in Cantonese. 
3
 In many cases this would have an ethnic-cultural label marking a distinction from other 
ethnic groups or foreigners in HK, and without any political or nationalistic connotation. 
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participation and voting rights that preceded this. On the other side, the ruling KMT 
sought to justify its legitimacy and was driven to reform itself and electoral system. 
As Shelly Rigger notes, ‘in propaganda terms, local elections helped the ruling 
party support its claim to democracy. In practical terms,… by rewarding local 
politicians and factions who joined the ruling party, elections helped Taiwanese 
overcome their distrust of the KMT and become active in politics through the ruling 
party’ (1999: 179–180). The first non-supplemental elections were held, 
respectively for the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan, for the first time 
recognizing that delegates who nominally represented seats on the Chinese 
Mainland, and who had therefore remained in office for decades unchallenged, 
needed to be phased out. Nearly all of the newly-elected delegates represented 
Taiwan (Copper 1994: 23). In 1994, direct elections were brought in for the 
provincial governorship of Taiwan, and for the mayorship of Taipei and Kaohsiung; 
the first direct presidential election took place in 1996. Lee Teng-hui, who is a 
benshengren and also KMT member, was the first elected President of the ROC. 
With Lee’s authorization, the 2-28 Incident and the White Terror were able to be 
commemorated in public, and the events therefore gained a certain degree of 
recognition leading to compensation (Shih 2014). Between 2000 and 2008, an 
opposition DDP member, Chen Shui-bian, was elected as the first non-KMT 
President of the ROC. As such, a two party system was in this way established in 
Taiwan. In 2008, another KMT politician, Ma Ying-jeou, won the Presidency with 
58.45 per cent of the popular vote and was re-elected in 2012 with 51.60 per cent.  
   After 2000, Hong Kong became a ‘city of protests’. As discontent mounted about 
livelihood issues, poor governance, interference by Beijing, and tycoon-
government cronyism, Hongkongers’ sense of identity and what constituted their 
‘core values’ grew. There were protests against the demolition of old colonial sites 
at the Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier, which were partly against the government’s 
‘raze and re-develop’ priorities which favoured commercial interests, and partly a 
defence of iconic symbols of Hong Kong’s identity (Cartier 2011). The First of July, 
the anniversary of the handover, became a ritual day of protest. Even so, the 2003 
July First demonstration of over 500,000 people was a watershed moment in Hong 
Kong history. The target was Beijing’s insistence that Hong Kong implement Article 
23 of the Basic Law, which stipulated the introduction of anti-subversion laws. The 
demonstration alarmed Beijing and, though the Hong Kong government withdrew 
the proposal in the face of public opposition, Mainland pressure to re-introduce the 
laws remained. In the aftermath of the July First march, Beijing also pushed for 
greater patriotic education of Hongkongers and tightened its politico-administrative 
grip on the HKSAR. 
   Such measures to promote patriotism were castigated locally: They produced a 
public backlash which, in 2012, culminated in large scale anti-government protests. 
As with the controversy over Article 23, the government was eventually forced to 
withdraw its proposals for a National and Moral Education curriculum in the face of 
overwhelming public hostility (Bradsher 2012). There was also growing anti-
Mainland feeling, principally against a flood of Mainland tourists permitted to enter 
the HKSAR following the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 
introduced by Beijing in 2003. Intended to support Hong Kong in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis and SARS, this economic integration is now viewed by 
Hongkongers as a Trojan Horse through which Beijing can infiltrate the territory. In 
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recent months, Hongkongers have pointed to their fate as a warning to the people 
of Taiwan, whose government is embarking upon similar economic arrangements 
with Beijing. 
   In the final years of colonial rule, the last British Governor, Chris Patten, extolled 
the rule of law as Hong Kong’s foundation stone, the guarantor of Hongkongers’ 
liberty and freedoms. The Bill of Rights, introduced in 1991, consolidated these 
promises. Fears that Beijing would seek to undermine these liberties have been 
ever-present – Patten warned Hong Kong people that they might have to ‘stand up’ 
for their rights if this should happen. Increasingly, this is what has transpired. 
Throughout the mid-2000s, further National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee (NPCSC) interventions in the operation of the legal system followed, 
leading to claims that the rule of law was dead in Hong Kong. Some of the clashes 
centred on the issue how the basic Law’s provisions about universal suffrage, 
promised in the Basic Law but never delivered, should be interpreted. In 2004, the 
NPCSC declared that direct elections for the Chief Executive or Legislative Council 
violated the Basic Law, reneging on the understanding that this would be in place 
for the 2007 elections. In 2013, the issue remained controversial, as Beijing sought 
to back-peddle on the promise of universal suffrage.  
   There is now in Hong Kong a new generation of activists, too young to have 
clear memories of British rule, whose critical politics is less a legacy of British 
colonialism than of Mainland mishandling of Hong Kong affairs. For these young 
activists, the social, political and economic conflicts since 1997 have led to 
wholesale disillusion with the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula, and they have 
joined forces with more established groups to resist ‘Mainlandization’. Their often 
fluid, fleeting, and unconventional political activities regularly wrong-foot the 
HKSAR administration and capture public attention. Meanwhile, the ‘Occupy 
Central’ civil movement for universal suffrage and social media websites frequently 
call upon Taiwanese to heed Hong Kong’s fate after re-integration. In asserting 
their own identity as separate from that of the Mainland, Hongkongers increasingly 
perceive their fate as linked to that of Taiwan. 
   In March and April 2014, Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement saw civic occupation 
and protest against the ratification of the Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement 
(CSSTA) with China. Their demonstrations caught political observers by surprise, 
in part because the protestors utilized tactics by so-called Occupy protestors that 
were previously seen in New York and Madrid: they occupied buildings, blocked 
roads and utilized social media. On 17 March, the KMT government forced the 
CSSTA through the KMT-majority legislature with hardly any review; the speed 
with which it went through can be contrasted with the subsequent controversy and 
ongoing debate that erupted in Taiwan’s society. The CSSTA will bring about 
monumental changes: in particular, it will further open Taiwan’s service market to 
China, in up to 64 categories of industries. These include education, retail, 
transportation, telecommunication, and cultural industries (for further information, 
see Harrison 2014). The passing of the CSSTA will have a significant impact on 
the livelihoods of ordinary Taiwanese people in various sectors; in particular, it 
may cause serious damage to Taiwan’s economic autonomy, and some suggest it 
will also be detrimental to freedom of speech, and even national sovereignty. It 
thus has the potential to alter Taiwan’s character and democratic achievements 
fundamentally; yet such a critical decision for Taiwan’s future was rushed through 
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the legislature in a manner that many believe violates the principles of democratic 
transparency and accountability. Meanwhile, President Ma’s approval rating 
dropped to less than 10 per cent, making the issue a question of his and his party’s 
ongoing political legitimacy.  
   The Sunflower Movement merged more than 50 civic organizations in Taiwan, all 
of which agreed to transcend their differences to fight for a common cause. As 
Michael Cole (2014) notes, although the campaigners did not succeed in forcing 
the KMT to change its policy, they nevertheless succeeded in making the CSSTA 
and the failing governmental mechanisms into a national issue, and even an 
international one. It is now clear that the impact of the Sunflower Movement has 
extended beyond Taiwan, serving as an inspiration for other campaigning groups; 
in particular, there have been growing exchanges between Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and elsewhere among likeminded youth and organizations. 
Conclusion 
Hong Kong and Taiwan were both regarded by Chinese Imperial courts 
dismissively, and they became of interest to Han Chinese mainly in the context of 
resistance to non-Han rule over the Mainland. Both locations were thus viewed as 
potentially subversive, and they were only brought under imperial authority to 
prevent them from becoming further sources of unrest.   
   The centre–periphery dynamic that dominated Taiwan in the Imperial period can 
also be seen in the power relations between the ruling KMT Mainlanders and the 
Taiwanese after 1945. During the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘Outside the KMT Party’ 
movement sought to radicalize opposition to KMT authoritarian rule, and also gave 
momentum to calls for democratic reform and Taiwanization. In the 1990s, Taiwan 
became the first Chinese polity to become democratic, following the end of martial 
law and one-party rule. The politics of Taiwanese identity has since that time 
played an important role in Taiwan’s democracy. 
   In Hong Kong, the British colonial government’s policy was to emphasize rule of 
law, in an attempt to ensure that neither Communists nor Nationalists would 
predominate. This has sometimes led to the portrayal of Hong Kong as apolitical, 
or of British rule as impartial, but the colonial situation was of course saturated with 
political and commercial interests of various kinds and it is hard to see how a 
colonial administration could ever be ‘impartial’. However, from the 1960s a 
younger generation born in Hong Kong began to claim the city as their home, and 
the socio-political and economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s laid the 
foundation for the emergence of a distinctive Hong Kong identity based in 
particular in forms of popular culture such as film and music. As the British 
implemented decolonization in other regions of the Empire, Hong Kong remained 
in a political limbo, caught between the desire of Beijing for ‘unification’, and in 
London for a peaceful way out. The Joint Declaration of 1984 made limited 
guarantees about the Hong Kong ‘way of life’, while setting in motion a timetable 
for limited political reforms. The interpretation of that document has, however, 
fuelled on-going political protests by Hongkongers seeking greater political 
autonomy from the perceived anarchy of the Mainland. 
   In both locations, long histories of settlement, evacuation and re-settlement in 
contexts of war, conflict and resistance have driven the inhabitants to emphasize 
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particular senses of self, and thus of identity. These in turn are bound up with 
particular values, such as democracy in Taiwan and the rule of law in Hong Kong. 
The so-called ‘ethnic’ identities, such as benshengren in Taiwan and 
Heunggongyahn in Hong Kong, have emerged as new markers of difference over 
the last two or one decades; they challenge the very concept of ‘the Chinese’, and 
the result has been a politics based around representations of culture and 
language and competing identities. As such, following Helen Siu, ‘the term 
“Chineseness” is not an immutable set of beliefs and practices, but a process 
which captures a wide range of emotions and states of being. It is a civilization, a 
place, a polity, a history, and a people who acquire identities through association 
with these characteristics’ (1994:19). This observation – that identity is something 
fluid, negotiated, constructed and acquired, and that particular identities have 
emerged out of social, political and economic relationships – is one which, as this 
Special Issue attests, remains pertinent to contemporary debates over history, 
languages, human rights, and the politics of representation in Hong Kong and in 
Taiwan. 
   It is therefore hoped that this Special Issue’s comparative perspective will 
contribute towards understanding the processes that are involved with the 
transition to a representative political system in Hong Kong and the consolidation 
of democratic culture in Taiwan. Included here are essays as well as related 
commentary pieces and book reviews. Carol Jones explores law, society and 
culture in post-1997 Hong Kong, while Bruce Jacobs presents some hypotheses 
about how Taiwan’s colonial experiences relate to the development of ethnic 
identities. Also on identities, Fu-Chang Wang looks at the development of Holo 
identity in contemporary Taiwan, while Malte Kaeding compares the role of 
Taiwan’s social movements and perceptions of post-handover Hong Kong in the 
context of Hongkongization. Civil society movements are examined through a 
study by Simona Grano of movements in opposition to nuclear energy. 
Commentary pieces look at Hong Kong as a prototype of Taiwan for reunification, 
and at the notion of Taiwan as ‘liminal’ (the last in response to an essay on 
liminality that appeared in the previous volume of this journal). There is also a 
substantive review essay by Allen Chun that explores differences between Taiwan 
and Hong Kong by placing recent academic writing about the two locations side by 
side.  
   Before ending, there are two further ideas to develop from this introductory 
discussion: the first is that of multiple forms of Chinese-ness. One might ask why 
these different forms – for example those to be found in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
China – are valued so differently. The second related idea is that these different 
forms of identity also have their own developing processes and histories. In this 
Special Issue the authors go some way in demonstrating how senses of identity 
are formed historically, often in moments of conflict, and are invented or fabricated 
with whatever comes to hand. When we see that identities – our identities – are 
‘things’ that we ourselves have fashioned in the course of our pasts and histories, 
then we can appreciate that identity is surely not only associated with the grand 
project of nation-building, but is actually something rather less monumental and 
essential. The processes of sharing common pasts and memories are more fragile, 
but also more precious. As such, rather than being a comprehensive comparison 
of both locations, this selection of essays aims to make a small contribution to 
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debates and research particularly over issues of Taiwanization and 
Hongkongization, as well as of struggles for democracy and politics of 
representation.  
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